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C...VERO

tI. F'BANKLIN ETC. BENEVOLENT
[38 C.2&1 301; 223 P.2d "11

Soo. 301

[B. F. No. 18155. In Bank.Oet. 31, 1950.]

lIENRY CAVERO, Respondent, v. FRANKLIN GENERAL
BENEVOLENT SOCIETY (a Corporation), Appellant.'

J

[1] Appea1-QUestiODS of Law and Fact-Oonsideration of Evi. denC8.-On appeaJtbe evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to rei:lpOndent.
.12] Hospitals-Evidence.-In .an action against a hospital and
other defendants for the wrongful death of plaintiff's 3-year.
old child while having his tonsils and adenoids removed, in j'
which the eomplaint alL e··' that bccause of defendants' negligence "the child was cllused to • • . su1focate and drown in
its own blood •• .," plaintiff did ~ot fail to prove his cause (If
action where it appcared from the e-vidence that the jury could
properly, and must be presumed to, have concluded from tht·
autopsy report thnt the iUlmediate cause of death was til.!
inspiration of hemorrhagic mllterial resulting frOID the ne(·t'';·
sity of giving artificial reSpiration, and that that neeessity t
was caused in turn by the erratic and excessive admiuistratiulJ \
of anesthetic.
:,(3] Id.-Evidcncc.-lnan action against a hospital and others for
.
the death of pl,yiiiiff's S-year-old cbiJd whileundergoinl! <l
tonsillectolUY i l l the hospital, the evidence supported the 1111plied finding of the jury thnt the nurse-anesthetist attendiJlg tIl('
operation WIUI the employe or agent of defendant hOllpitnl.
rather thun of defendant doctors,and that the responsibility
was at least primarily that of the anesthetist.
[4] Negligence-Evidence-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-The eonditions for
the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine are that the
accident be of a kind that does not happen in the absence of
some negligence, the agency or instrumentality causing it must
have been within the exclusive control of the defendant, and
it must not have been due to any voluntary action on the part
f)f the plaintiif.
[5] Rospitals-Instructions.-In an· action for the wrongful death .
of plnintiff's 3-year-old lIOn while undergoing a tonsillectomy
and under the -influence of a gas anesthetic, an instruction on
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was proper where the evidence
established, in the abs('uce of explanation, that the ebiJd's death
was due to something which ordinarily docs Dot occur in the
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[2] Bee 13 Oal.Jur. 775.
[4J See 19 OaLJur. 704; 38 Am.Jur. 989.
Melt. DJg. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § l243; [2,3] Hospitals, 119; [4] Negligence, 1l.33; [5,6] Hospita1a, 120.
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absence of ncgligenee, that it was caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the control of defendant, and that it
was not due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of either plllintifi' or the child.
(8] Id.-Instruetions.-Where in an aetion for the wrongful death
of plaintiff's minor son while undergoing a tonsillectomy an
instruction on the res ipsa loquitur rule is properly given as to .
all defendants, it is not made erroneous as to defendant hospital
by the fact that the jury accepted the explanatory evidence caB
being sufficiently exculpatory in respect to the doctors but DO'
to the hospital.
.' -

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Oourt of the
Oity and County of San Francisco. James G. Oonlan, Judge.
Affirmed.
Action for damages for wrongful death.
plaintiff affirmed.

Judgment' f~r

Hadsell, Sweet, Ingalls & Murman and Sydney P.
for Appellant.

Yurman ';
.

Hartley F. Pea~ Gus L. Baraty, Howard I:IJI~!$.~!!l
A. Smith and Alan L. Bonriington as Amicus
behalf of Appellant.
Hallinan, MacInnis & Zamloch, James Martin Macinnis
William F. Cleary for Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-In this action for the wrongful death
plaintiff's 3-year::Old son the jury returned a verdict
favor of olaintifi' and against defendant Franklin GelDel'lIJM~
Benevolent Society,l a corporation (hereinafter termed
hospital), and against plaintitf and in favor of defendants
Nellie B. Null and Dr. John NulJ.2 Judgment was l!n1:erea
accordingly, and the hospital appeals.
It appears that on the morning of July 5, 1946, JI~a......· IOn entered defendant hospital for the purpose of having .
tonsils lind adenoids removed by the Drs. Null. During
operation the anesthetic, which was gas and ether, was
ministered by a nurse-anesthetist. The patient started to
out of the anesthetic on two or three occasions and the
INaDled in plaiDtiB'. eomplaint (second amended) &I "FlraDlWl!'JI
Bospitul."
1.AJao .uamecl .. & clefendant.. but.lI.ot. aerved. was a llulrse~aae.D4~
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thetist administered more ether. After the third incre8l>e in
ether Dr. John Null noticed that the blood in the paticI;t'li
throat was dark, which indicated that something was wrong,
and he also·then found that breathing had ceased. He thereupon began to apply manual artificial respiration, while tho f .
anesthetist left the room to secure a mechanical resuscitator.
She returned with a resuscitator three or four minutes later
but neither it nor other means used was successful in preserving or restoring life to the child.
As grounds for reversal, defendant hospitaleontends that:
1. Plaintiff failed to' prove certain material allegations of
his complaint;
,
2. The judgment rests on the doctrine of respondeat superior, based on the erroneous theory that the anesthetist was an .
employe of defendant hospital;
3. The trial court erred to the prejudice of the hospital in
the giving of certain instructions, particularly in.~truction8 \,
proposed by the defendant rloctors relative to the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur.
[1] The evidenct'. whit· .. must be viewed on appeal in a
light most favorable to rl'lo;poudent (Estate of Bristol (1943),
-,,---~3 .cal.2d 221, 223 114:l P.2d 689])J may be summarized as
follows:
' ,
The child was taken to defendant hospital .at the suggestion
of defendant Dr. Nellie B. Null, who had previously examined
him. The child's mother paid a fee to the hospital for use of
the operating room and for the anesthetic.
The patient's tonsils were moderately enlarged and inflamed but were nc>t in an acute condition; the operation was
nllt an unusual case or an emergency nor did it involve major
liurgery. When the child was brought into the operating room
h" bad already been placed in an "intermediate" or "pre~ilQinary anesthetic state"; after he was placed on the operatIIlg table further ether was administered, 1irst through a mask
l,y drops, and latE'r "by tUbe, by pa, causing the ether to
bubble thrc>ugh tubes."
.
Dr. John Null, who is the son of Dr. Nellie B. Null, testmed
t!lat "bubbling ether through that tube while the ehild con...
hllues unconscious . . . is • CODStant process, constantly
\'
"'atclled, and varies in degree of how fast the bubbling occurs'
.. '. l:Al ~eat amount of discretion [is] necessary in the
IIdmlnlstratIon of that ether through the tube . . . Unles... tht\
proper amount is given the child would not at.&7 in the proper
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stage of anesthesia, and if it bubbles too slowly he will probably j'
awake and be turning, and if it is given too fast, if he breathes '
it too fast it is apt to stop his heart . . . [T]here is a grave
danger which may well occur if the ether is sent too rapidly in
the form of bnbbles through that tube"; the witness further
stated that ether "is a relatively safe anesthetic, and ... is
one . . . entrusted to the less experienced, in fact, that is :.,
what you train them on in giving anesthetics, is a tonsillectomy._..:
It is considered safe, but any anesthetic is dangerous .•• ';
[T]he danger may reflect itself . . . By the abolishing of the'
eye reflexes, which the anesthE'sia blocks; by the changes in the
rate of respiration, and changes in the pnlse rate and color
. . . [W]hile an anesthetic is being administered ... through
the tube . . . the anesthetist I mllst] . . . Watch the color, the
patient's pulse, respiration and reflexes. especially the eye
reflexes . . . it is her duty " rTlhe rrflexes should [not]
return at all during the cOUr!~f' of surgf'ry to a person who is
supposedly in the proper state of anf'~thcsia . . . Severa)
times during . . . the operation [here involved 1 the child
would partially regain consciousness so that the reflexes in the
throat, the gag reflex would rE'turn, and she fthe anesthetist~ .
would have to increasE' the depth of the anesthE'sia before0:J',
operation could be continued": the witness attributed "th,,at "
return of the reflex action to . . . too little ether being ae!- ,.
ministered" and "two or three times to he or his mother asked 1
the ~esthhetisshtto affdminlister more ethIer, Whhicflh she fdid "By
openmg t e uto va ve so as to ,et t e ow 0 oxygen
increase"; the witness further stated that it was "unusual for
this child to awaken to the extent . . . described . . . occasionally it happens, but it is not supposed to . . . This child 1
had no unusual tolerance for ether" and the witness did not
know of "any reason to expect those reflexes to return during
the course of the operation."
While the child was "in the depths of anesthE'sia" Dr. Nelhe
Null started to remove the tonsils and Dr. John Null assisted
by swabbing and nsing "the suction . . . a mechanical device . . . to pull the blood, mucous and phlegm out of the
throat"; just after the second tonsil W8..<; removed and after
the third increase in anesthesia he noticed th(' "blood was
extremely dark . . . [which) means there has not been a
proper oxygen supply, and either the child was too sound
asleep and not sleeping [sic] enough. . and I called to the'
anf'~thetist about it ..
fThe 1 anesthetist usually watches i
the blood, the flow and color . . . [which] shows whether the i
°
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child is breathing properly or not, and not asleep" and the
witness assumed "she was doing this." At the same time he
., also looked up at the child and I didn't see any respiration,
which also told me there was something wrong . . . [The
anesthetist] apparently hadn't noticed it ... {It is myl
opinion the anesthetist gave too much ether to the child . . .
MOl'e than indicated by the circumstances ... [and] that
was the cause of the darkening of the blood . . . {W]hen that
kind of danger takes plnN' ... the anesthetist usually immediately stops the flow of ether and artificial respiration is
immediately instituted .. This time I turned the suction
over to my mother and fbegan giving artificial] respiration
•.. with my hands, but the best way is by a mechanical
!'esllscitator, which applies carbon dioxide and oxygen into
the lungs ... the very best procedure is to apply the . . .
resuscitator . . . at once .. I W 1hill.' I was giving manual
respiration I called for the resuscitator." The machine was
not in the room and the anest heti~t left the room and returned
with it three or four minutes later; meanwhile artificial
respiration was continued. Dr.•John Null testified that he
did not think that at that time "the child was actually alive,
in the sense of awake. There was no way of telling wh~tber
it was beyond help of recalling the life or not, but it is possibie
that if we had had the mechanical resuscitator there we could
have gotten the carbon dioxide and oxygen in there and it
would have started breathing, but to all outward appearances
it was dead. Lots of times that will happen and they are
given artificial respiration and the child will come back to
life." The resllscitator was used but failed to revive the
ehild, and both doctors were of the opinion the child had died
by the time the machine was bronght into the room, and that
the death resulted from an overdosage of ether by the anesthetist; Dr. John Null also testified that in his opinion a
competent anesthetist would not "make a mistake of that
kind," and Dr. Nellie Null stated that she had performed
"hundreds of these tonsillectomil,'s" since she had first been
licensed to practice in 1906 and this was .. the first case in
which a death has ever occurred in one of" them. The
doctors further testified that "it is up t.o the anesthetist to put
the child to sleep, that is her job" and it was her duty if
she sees the patient "moving around, to get him under so we
can proceed."
The doctors stated also that the mechanical resuscitator

)
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was "standard equipment for hospital surgery rooms" whieh':J
"we expect ... to be present in any kind of an operation," ,
and it "should be immediately available, .•. it is not alwaYl:,
present right in the room, but should be there or close by."',
A doctor would normally "expect to find it in the room,
although it is not always there." The hospital stipulated
that "it is standard practice in the hospitals in San Francisco '
to have a resuscitator available for use in the operating
rooms."
A coroner's autopsy report indicated that the child's death.
was caused by "inspiration of hemorrhagic material." The
doctors testified that it was necessary to cease using the suc.
tion device in order to apply artificial respiration and that
artificial respiration would have forced such material into
the lungs.
Concerning the employment of the anesthetist the doctors
testified that the hospital, rather than the doctor, provides the
nurses, the anesthetist, the operating room, table, and instru.
ments and "everything for the operation" and that the doc·
tors did not select nor pay the fee of the anesthetist who
worked in this case. Dr. John Null also stated that he did
not employ the anesthetist and was not present •• at any con- '
versation in which" his mother employed her. Mrs. Steveii:-~
Bon, an employe of defendant hospital,testified that she is
a "nurse-anesthetist" who was "in charge of all anesthetists" ,
at defendant hospital at the time of the operation here in·'
volved; among the anesthetists "employed by the hospital" "
was the one who worked in this case; since October, 1946, i
a licensed physician who "specializes in the administra- \
tion of anesthetics" had been in charge of the anesthetists;
"throughout the past several years . . . more and more hos- ;
pitals have placed licensed physicians in charge of . . . their \
ranesthetic] department"; the nurse-anesthetist who worked
in this case •• was in the employ of the hospital just as any
other anesthetist was," her salary was paid "directly by"
defendant hospital, she received no "fees or salaries from
surgeons using the facilities of the hospital" but was "paid
by the hospital alone," and she left the employ of the hospital
in April, 1947.
Mrs. Stevenson testified further that she eouldn't state
"accurately" how many of the defendant hospital's seven
operating rooms were in use at the time of the operation here
involved. bllt it W8o;; hpr "best recollection" that all the rooms
were then in use "because some of those rooms are runnm,

:1
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under local anesthetics where we are not involved"; that the
hospital had only one mechanical resuscitator and she did not
know where it was on the day here involved.
Dr. Cardwell, the physician in charge of anesthetists at
defendant hospital since October, 1946, testified that he had
bE'en trained and had practiced his profession in Washington,
D. C., prior to World War II; in 1945 while he was stationed
in northern California during service with the United States
Navy, he visited three hospitals in San Francisco and had
observed therein only one resuscitator "in connection with one
operating suite or one surgery suite"; the surgery suite at
defendant hospital consists of eight operating rooms; in the
other three San Francisco hospitals he had visited five rooms
was the minimum he had observed to constitute a surgery
suite; he did not know the number of hospitals in San Francisco: so far as he knew only two hospitals in San Francisco
have resuf\citating devices, but "they could have them in
hospitals where" he had "not even visited"; "the idea of
having a resuscitator present in or near a surgery room is
so that if some emergency arises causing the respiration of
a patient to disappear it can be used at once": "no matter
how far science -may have advanced, the anesthetist must
alwaYR be alert and vigilant during tbe operative procedure
. . . The greatest . . . skill will serve the anesthetist naught
if Rhe relaxes her vigilance at any time . . .; it is a difficult
and dangerous field, in which vigilance must be added to
scientific training."
1. Asserted Failure of Proof
Tn the complaint it is alleged (paragraph VIII) "That .••
defendants ... so carelessly, negligently and recklessly performed the said tonsillectomy operation as to . . . cause the
. - . child . . . to suffer . . . a severe hemorrhage therefrom,
and did carelessly, negligently and recklessly allC7W hemorrhagic material to fio'v unchecked into the lungs of the ..• !
child. [Paragraph IX.] That as a direct and proximate resnlt of the carelessness, negligence and reckles.c;ness of the de-'
fenrlants . . . said . . . child was caused to . . . suffocate
ann rlrown in itR own blood ... "
Defendant hospital urges that although plaintiff alleged
"that thE' child Rllffocated in blood ... Plaintiff didn't TE'ally
prove anything but. if it ('lIn be said that anything was proved.
it waR that thp chilo mn" haw rlif'rl from too much anesthetic," and that therefore, under the provisions of section

1
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" 471 of the Code of Civil Procedure' plainti1f failed to prove
his cause of action.
[a] It is apparent, however, from the evidence related ""
hereinabove that the jury could properly, and must be pre.;
sumed to, have concluded from the 'autopsy report that the
immediate cause of death was the "inspiration of hemorrhagie
material," that such inspiration resulted from the necessit, .•
to give artificial respiration and to cease using the suctiOD. ';
device, and that that necessity waseaused. in turn by the "
erratic and excessive administration of anesthetic. Defendant'a
contention of failure of proof in this respect is, therefore,
without merit.
2. The Doctrine of Respondeat SuperWr
[3] Defendant hospital contends that as a matter of law
the nurse-anesthetist was the employe or agent of the defendant doctors, rather than of the hospital, and that the hospital
cannot be held responsible for any negligence of such anesthetist. Again, it is apparent that the evidence amply supports
the implied finding that the anesthetist wa~ the hospital 'a
employe in the operation here involved. The cases relied
upon by the hospital (see Ybarra v. 8pa1lgard (1944),25 Cal.
~ ~6, 491. {1M .P.2d -687,l~2-A.1r.R:-4258 J;-iD -whieh,-+lffr--.lJ
)court stated "it appears'· the anesthetist and special ,nurse
were employes of the hospital owner <and W.are v.' Ctdp (1937~
24 Cal.App.2d 22, 27 [74 P.2d 283], in which it was held the ,,'
evidence failed to support a finding that a special nul'Rt' was '
the employe of defendant hospital) ditier faetually from the
instant case and do not compel a holding here that the anesthetist was not a hospital employe (see HaUin4n v. Pnndl,
(1936), 17 Cal.App.2d 656. 662 [62 P.2d 1075]).
~i
The hospital's contention that the operating doctors rather
thali the anesthetist were responsible for the proper administration and regulation of the anesthetic relates solely to a
conftict in the evidence. The implied determination of the
jury that the mentioned responsibility was at least primarily .that of the anesthetist is supported by the testimony of the
doctors which has been heretofore quoted.
8. The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
If] At the request of the defendant doctors the court gave
ares ipsa loquitur instruction applicable against the doctors
8That lection provides: "Where .•• the alle&'ation of the elaiD
••. to whieh the proof is directed. is unproved. Dot in lome particul..
or particulars only, but in its genE-raJ scope and meaning, it Ia Ilot tc
be deemed a case of variance • • • but a failure of puAf."
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and the hospital.· As declared in Ybarra v. 8pangard (1944:),
rupra, 25 Ca1.2d 486, 489, quoting from Prosst"l·, Torts, p. 295,
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has three conditions: "(1)
the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused
by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control
of the defE-ndant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff." In
Engelking v. Carlson (1939),13 Cal.2d 216,221-222 {S8 P.2d
695\, where the peroneal nerve was severed in the course of
an operation on plaintiff's knee, this court declared, "It is
truE' that in a restricted class of cases the courts have applied
the do('trinE' of res Ipsa loquitur in malpractice cases. But it
has only been invoked where a layman is able to say as a
matter of common Imo'\\'ledge and observation that the consequences of professional treatment were not such as ordinarily would have follow(>d if due care had been exercised.
"For example, it has been applied where a sponge was left
in the body of the patient aftE'r closing an operative incision
[citations] ; where the patient was bnrned by the application
of hot compresses or heating apparatns rcitations1; where the
patient wa.q burned through the operation of an X-ray machine {citations J; and where the patient sustained an infection through the use of an unsterillzed hypodermic needle
fcitations] . In each one of thesE' situations the rule was applied because common knowledge and experience teaches that
the result was ont' which would not have occurred if due care
had been exercised,
.
"But thE' present case shows an entirely ditterent situation.
Here what was done lies outside the realm of the layman'.
experience. Medical evidence is required to show not only
what occurred but how and why it occurred. That evidence
"The instruetion reads as follows: "1 instruet· you that this is •
ease in whieh the doetrine of res ipsa loquitur, that is to say, the thing
speaks for itself, is .applieable to the Franklin Hospital, Dr. Nellie
Null and Dr. John Null, and the defendants will not be held blameless
exeept upon a showing either '(I) of a satisfaetory explanation of
the aeeident. that is, an affirmative showing of a definite eause for
the seddent, in which· eause no element of neglige nee on the part of
the defendant inheres, or (B) of sueh eare in aU possible respects as
neee88arily to lead to the eonelusion that the aeeident could not
have happened from want of eare, but must have been due to some
unpreventable cause, althongh the eJ[Aet eause is nnknown. In the
latter ease, iuasmueh 8S the process of reasoning is one of exelusiou,
the eare shown must be slitisflH"tOry in the Rense that it eovers all
eauses whieh due care on the part of the defendant might have pre·
.ented! "
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establishes beyond qu~stion not only that the peroneal nerve
may be injured even where due care is used but that thil
unfortunate result invariably occurs in a limited number opt ,.'
cases. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is, therefore, entirely ,
inapplicable and no malpractice has been proved."
And in Moore v. Belt (1949), 34 Cal.2d 525, 530-531 '
P .2d 509], after citing some fourteen cases OD the proposition, .
it was stated that "ID the cases cited where the doctrine W&l
held applicable evidence that the defendant did not (alne-i
the injury was remote and it followed as a matter of common ,
knowledge from the Dature of the injury that the result would
not happen without carelessness or negligence. In the present
case the inference that the injury was not caused by the de· :
fendant, but from some source theretofore existing in the' \
plaintiff's system, was not remote but could be drawn from.
substantial evidence in the record. On the evidenc,e of the ,',
plaintiff's medical history the jury was not required to but,
could reasonably conclude that the prior infection, and not '1
any negligent act on the part of the defendant, was the pron. ~;
mate cause of the trouble. The inference based on common ',:
knowledge is at the root of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.' ':
Before it could be drawn under the facts of this ease the jury;~
I, would ha'Ve to reject the hypothesis that the plaintiff's prio "~,
'condition was the proximate cause. [Citations.]"
, ;'
Neither party cites, nor has any case been discovered,
",
which res ipsa loquitur has bt'en held applicable where a
patit'Dt dies during a minor operation while under the inftu- "'
ence of an anesthetic. Defendant hospital urges that Ybarra ],
v. Spangard (1944), supra, 25 Cal.2d 486, is distinguishable '
in that there the plaintiff, while uncon~ious during an appendectomy, received a traumatic injury ,to his 8houlde~ ,
healthy part of the body, not the subject of treatment nor';
within the area covered by the operation-which a layman_~,'
could say would not have occurred in the absence of negB-)!,
gence, whereas here expert medical testimony is necessary to '1:'
determine whether or not negligence caused the patient'.·'
death during the course of the operation.
~~
Plaintiff argues, however, that expert testimony was relied '~
npon by the plaintiff in the Ybarra case, to establish an essen- 1".,',·~,'
tiallink in the chain of causation, and quotes from this court'.
summary of the evidence, as follows (p. 488 of 25 Ca1.2d):
"Plaintiff also consulted Dr. Wilfred Sterling Clark, who
had X-ray pictures taken which showed an area of diminished
aensation below the shoulder and atrophy and wasting aw,y
',·1'.

)
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of the muscles around the shoulder. In the opinion of Dr.
Clark, plaintifr's condition was due to trauma or injury by
pressure or strain, applied between his right shoulder and
neck.
"Plaintiff was also examined by Dr. Fernando Garduno,
who expressed the opinion that plaintiff's injury was a paralysig of traumatic origin, not arising from pathological causes,
and not systemic, and that the injury resulted in atropby.
-loss of use and restriction of motion of the right arm and
shoulder. "
In the instant case there was no suggestion at the trial
that plaintiff's son died as the result of a preexisting condi·
tion, whether pathological or systemic in nature. The expert
evidence is to the contrary and in this respect is wholly uncontradicted. It shows that, except for infected tonsils and
adenoids and a slight temperature due to such infection, the
(~hild was normal and healthy, and that the tonsillectomy was
not a major operation nor performed as an emergency. Dr.
Nellie Null. as heretofore stated, testified that in her forty
years of practice she had performed "hundreds of these tonsillectomies" and that this was "the first case in which a death
bas ever occurred in one of" them.
[5] Under the circumstances shown We Ilo!<! tenable plaintiff's position that the evidence prima facie estabiiShes,-Ui-the-'absence of explanation, that "the child's death was due to
something which ordinarily does not occur in the absence-of
negligence, that it was caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the control of defendants, and that it was not due to
any [legally material] voluntary action or contribution on
the part of either plaintiff or the child," and, consequently,
that the res ipsa loquitur instruction was properly given.
[6] Since it was properly given as to all defendants, it is not
made erroneous as to defendant hospital by the fact that the
jury accepted the explanatory evidence as being sufficiently
eXCUlpatory in respect to the doctors but not to the hospital.
A review of other instructions criticized by defendant hospital discloses nei prejudicial error.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Spence, J., eon·
curred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
The .doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable unless
tLc accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in
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thE' abspncE' of someonf' 's negligence. (See Prosser, Torts,
p. 295.) Since the det.ermination whether the accident ia.
of that kind is usually made in the light of eommqn experi.
ence and since medical knowledge is not within common ex·
; periellCf', the 'doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is usually beld in.
i applicable in cases of malpractice. It can be invoked, bow· .
eVf'r. "where a layman is able to say as a matter of common:
knowledge .and observation that the consequences of profes- j'
sional treatment were not such as ordinarily would havefol·'
lowed if due care had been exercised." (Engelking v. OarlBon. 13 Cal.2d 216, 221 [88 P.2d 695].)
, ".
In Escola v. Ooca Oola Bottling 00.,24 Ca1.2d 453 {lSO
P.2d 436]. the court recognized that the doctrine may apply
eVE'n though expert testimony is necessary to establish that
the accident was of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in
thE' abRence of someone's negligence. The court noted that
in Honea v. City Dairy, Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614 [140 P.2d 369],
it refused to take judicial notice of the technical practices
of thE' bottling industry and therefore could n9t determine
whpther it could reasonably be concluded that Ii defect in a
bottle was more probably than not the result of negligence. i
1n the Escola case, however, there was expert testimony as to ~
such practices _and ,on the basis of that evidence the court
beld it could reasonably be concluded that it wa.s more prob...
able than not that the bottle exploded as the result of negli.,
gence. Thus, while ordinarily the occurrence of an accident :,
is not in itself evidence of negligence, it may be evidence '
thereof wben it can be said in the light of common experience
that the accident would not ordinarily have occurred in the
absence of negligence, or when experts in the field are able
to conclude on the basis of their knowledge and experience
that there is a balance of probabilities in favor of negligence
as the cause.
There is no valid objection to permitting proof of negligence
in malpractil:e cases by such circumstantial evidence. The law ,
requires that physicians and surgeons shall '" possess and
exercise that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care
ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of their profession under similar circumstances.'" (Sinz v. Owens, 33
Cal.2d 749, 753 [205 P.2d 3, 8 A.L.R. 757].) Experts may
testify that the procedure followed by the defendant feU short
of that commonly employed. and thus provide direct evidence
of negligence. Apart from the fact that a ct>rtain procedure
failed, however, what actually happened is often in doubt. In
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such situations expE\rts may know ali! laymen would not. that
it is more probable than not that the accident was the result
of negligence. If they so testify the jury may properly be
instructed that if they find on the basis of the expert testimony that ordinarily an accident of tht' kind in question does
not occur in the absence of negligence, they may infer that
thE' particular accident was the result of nt'gligence.
In the present case a child died on the operating table
during a tonsillE'ctomy. An instruction on the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur would be proper only if it may be said in
the light of common experience that such deaths do not ordinaril~' occur in the absence of negligence or if medical experts
had testified to that fact. Neither basis for the application
of the doctrine is present Common experience teaches only
that ordinarily persons do not die during the ('ourse of minor
operations. In the rare cases where deaths occur the layman
is with,9llt knowledge or experience to WE'igh the probabilities
of and against negligent conduct as the cause of dE'ath. It has
therefore generally been heJd that the doctrint' does not apply
when a patient dies under anesthesia during a minor operation such as a tonsillectomy or tooth t'xtraction. (Mitchell
v. Atkins, 36 Del. (6 W.W.11arr.) 451 1178 A. 593. 595];
Dolan v. O'Rourke, 56 N.D 416 [217 N.W. 61)6, 668); Johnson v. Arndt, 186 Minn. 253, 257 [243 N.W 67]; L01tdofl. v.
Rcott, 58 Mont. 645, 656 [194 P. 488, 12 A.L.R. 1487]; flee,
also, Nemer v Green, 316 Mich. 307 125 ~.W.2d 207]; Eggert
v. Dramb1trg, 197 Wis. 153 [221 N.W. 732] ; anno's., 12 A.L.R.
1493; 162 A.L.R. 1265, 1282-1284.)
There was nothing in the expert testimony relied upon iB.
thE' majority opinion to support a conclus10n that ordinarily
deaths do not occur in the course of tom,;lIectomies in the
absence of negligence. Dr. Null testified that she had performed "hundreds of these tonsillectomies" and that this
was" the first case in which a death had t>ver occurred." Her
testimony establishes only that such accidents are rare; it
was silent on the question as to what are the probable causes
when such deaths do occur. On the other hand, there was
evidence that all anesthetics· are dangerous; tbat the hazards
of anesthesia are so well known to the medical profession that
nli"lny of its members have specialized in that field; and that
it is always a delicate procedure to produce anesthesia.
From t.he foregoing expert testimony the jury would be
warranted in concluding. not that fin IInt>sthetic death was
more probabl.) than not the rc:mlt vI J.1.\~gligcllce, but that it
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resulted from unavoidable hazards attendant upon any anesthetization. (See Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont. 645, 656 [194 P.
488, 12 A.L.R. 1487].) Nevertheless the majority opinion
holds that it was proper to instruct the jury that as a matter
of law the occurrence of the accident gave rise to an inference
of negligence against all the defendants, an inference that
could be overcome only by affirmative evidence on their part
explaining the cause of death or showing that it could not
have occurred from any cause that due care on their part J
might have prevented.
.
By approving the instruction, the court in effect holds that
solely because an accident is rare it was more probably than
not caused by negligence. There is a fatal hiatus in such
reasoning. The fact that an accident is rare establishes only
that the possible causes seldom occur. It sheds no light on the
question of which of the possible causes is the more probable
when an accident does happen. Since common knowledge
and experience shed no light on this question when a death
occurs during the course of a tonsillectomy and since the record is devoid of expert testimony bearing ou the subject, the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable. I would there~
fore reverse the judgment.
Edmonds, J' f concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied November
t.7,1950. Edmonds, J., and Traynor, J., voted for a rehearing.

